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This paper addresses how nationalism influences Sino-Japanese relations and their 
foreign policy. Remaining disputes, security tension, and economic competition shape 
the dynamics of China and Japan, the second and third largest economies in the world 
respectively. Deng Xiaoping told the Japanese authorities in 1987 that "in regard to China-
Japan relations, reactions among youths, especially students, are strong. If difficult 
problems were to appear still further, it will become impossible to explain them to the 
people. It will become impossible to control them [the people]. I want you to understand 
this position which we are in”2. Currently, China’s new rising world order, coupled with 
economic interdependence and problems unsolved, has destabilized the Asia Pacific 
region. In this contested region, the politics of nationalism holds a certain weight to 
foreign policy planning, creating unstable power dynamics instead of cooperation.  These 
hostilities the countries share are a matter of concern for foreign policy makers, because 
they can be both a destabilizing and legitimizing element—a double-edged sword.  
In order to approach nationalism in international relations, this work analyzes a case 
study that is both current and pertinent: the Senkaku/Diaoyu Island dispute. In the past 
decade, there have been a number of tense encounters that had economic, diplomatic and 
security consequences. This dispute is relevant to the study of nationalism because it 
triggers the collective historical memory of both China and Japan, which is also closely 
related to the growth of nationalism in both countries. These islands, beyond economic 
and security reasons, are a matter of national pride, so foreign policy planners must 
outline and understand the growing nationalist sentiment when making decisions. 
Nationalism can be a reactive part of a nation, especially if it is gaining strength.  
The purpose of this paper is to pinpoint the key elements in Chinese and Japanese 
nationalism regarding Sino-Japanese relations, understand how they function and analyze 
in depth another dimension of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Island dispute. This is an ongoing 
issue that hasn’t been resolved, as well as other problematic points in Sino-Japanese 
relations. This work argues that nationalism can be very influenced by foreign policy, and 
 
1 This paper includes parts of my own research for the II Conference on HUME research on April 2020, 
and the final papers for the subjects of Cambio Social, Relaciones Internacionales en Asia Oriental and 
Política de Asia Oriental of the MA in East Asian Studies at the University of Salamanca. 
2 As quoted in Chen Weiss: 2013, p. 1. 
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vice versa, so thorough research on this topic might provide some insights for problem-
solving and working with Sino-Japanese relations.  
In the first place, this paper determines the concept of “nationalism” and how it can 
be interpreted in the context of international relations. Following this, there is an overview 
of Chinese popular nationalism, Japanese neo-nationalism and their respective historical 
backgrounds. Finally, this paper carries out a thorough analysis of nationalism in Sino-
Japanese relations and the Senkaku/Diaoyu Island dispute. Multiple sources have been 
checked from renowned experts, as well as articles in Chinese and Japanese to verify the 
information.  
 
THE CONCEPT OF NATIONALISM & INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
Firstly, the concept of nationalism is a highly contested notion among sociologists, 
nuanced depending on the object of study and the branch. Due to the multiplicity of 
perspectives, this paper focuses on the definition given in Nations and Nationalism3 by 
Ernst Gellner which states that nationalism is "a political principle [of an industrial 
society] which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent". What 
we call the nationalist sentiment is the anger that is aroused by the violation of this 
principle of congruence, or the satisfaction of it being fulfilled. The debate over this 
theory lies partly in the question of whether the nation can be understood as an individual 
modern reality, and it can certainly be a big question in the case of China because of what 
some call culturalism. However, this initial definition provides the basis for 
understanding nationalism. 
In the field of international relations, the definition given by Ernst Hass4 approaches 
the purpose given to nationalism in terms of foreign policy. He states that nationalist 
ideologies “make assertions about the nation’s claim to historical uniqueness, about the 
territory that the nation-state ought to occupy, and about the kinds of relation that should 
prevail between one’s nation and others”. While we can consider patriotism as national 
pride with an inclusive tone, nationalism focuses more on the perception and performance 
of one's nation with respect to another5. 
 
3 Gellner: 1983, p. 1 
4 Hass: 2000, p. 15 
5 Center for Strategic & International Studies: 2020. 
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The key to the problem lays in the following question: what role does nationalism 
play in the development of a nation's foreign policy? Is it an ally or an enemy to the goals 
of the state? Nationalism is not a direct driver of foreign policy, but it is an element that 
must be handled by governments carefully. As Xi Jinping noted in a 2013 campaign, 
"winning or losing the people’s support is an issue that concerns CPC’s survival or 
extinction”6. It is the nationalist sentiment that justifies demands for self-determination, 
perpetuating the system of the sovereign state and damaging it at the same time. Although 
nationalism is potentially destabilizing for maintaining the status quo in a territory, it is 
also a factor in territorial sovereignty7. 
The information suggests that nationalism has a geopolitical dimension, and this paper 
argues that there is a correlation between a nation's nationalist course and its foreign 
policy. As seen in Nazi Germany or imperialist Japan in the 20th century, their 
expansionist drive was partly justified by a nationalist discourse advocating the 
superiority of the nation.  
Looking back at East Asia in the 21st century, there is a growing trend of popular 
nationalism in China, and Shinzo Abe's policies have aroused interest in what is defined 
as the Japanese neo-nationalism. To determine how the nationalism of the two Asian 
tigers has developed, this paper analyzes the features of nationalism in each country and 
how they resemble or differ from each other in terms of their foreign policy, focusing on 
one case study: the Senkaku Island dispute. In this sense, it follows Gellner's reading of 
the nation as a modern reality and the principles mentioned to apply a theoretical 
framework. 
 
 OVERVIEW: APPROACHING CHINESE AND JAPANESE NATIONALISM 
 CHINESE POPULAR NATIONALISM 
 At the end of the Qing dynasty and in the beginning of the republic, after the defeat 
against Japan and the May Fourth Movement, a strong nationalist sentiment with anti-
imperialist and xenophobic motives appeared due to the Manchu government. This 
incipient nationalism peaked with the rise to power of the Communist Party of China in 
 
6 Economy: 2018, p. 36 
7 Griffiths and Sullivan: 1997, pp. 55-56 
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1949, coupled with a great unifying power. Throughout the 20th century, it was fed by the 
state discourse, but the economic situation in the early People's Republic of China 
mitigated it to some extent. Nevertheless, in terms of foreign policy, issues such as the 
Korean War, the Taiwan Strait crises of the 1950s, the Sino-Indian Border War of 1952, 
or China’s efforts to recover Hong Kong and Macao were connected to a general 
resentment of certain foreign forces8.   
 In the 1990s, the situation for nationalism changed. The government tried to 
control the flow of popular nationalism and promote patriotic education campaigns, 
seeking to align the interests of the nation with those of the state on a large scale. It could 
be argued that the economic development and the growth of Chinese popular nationalism 
are interconnected. Even so, the state sought to maintain a reactive and pragmatic position, 
with flexible tactics and avoiding seeking direct confrontation with other powers. During 
this decade, the people began to express more firmly their desire to defend the territorial 
integrity and historical justice of their nation. Certain sectors felt that the time had come 
for China to recover the position it deserved on the international scene. This became more 
visible with the advent of the Internet, which allowed the masses to participate in an 
interconnected community9.  
 In 1996, the book China Can Say No (中国可以说不) was published, a best-seller 
in China for its nationalist discourse that advocated strengthening the country on the 
international context. This book is a collection of essays with a critical anti-Japanese and 
anti-American sentiment, who are accused of conspiring against China. We can find in it 
some of the most recurrent elements of China’s current foreign policy: competitiveness 
with the U.S.A. and Japan, standing up to foreign pressure (say no), reaffirming China's 
position in terms of economic, military and technological strength, etc.10. On the last page 
of this book, it says: 
 “As a nation of manners, China's tradition of patience and tolerance shows its 
other side when treated rudely: ‘just as Xingtian11 wielded his shield, the fierce will 
prevails.’ Since the Opium War, the forces of justice have stood by China.” 
 
8 Townsend: 1992, pp. 121-122 
9 Zhao: 2013, pp. 2, 3, 4 
10 Tiezzi: 2014 




 Following this trend, the nationalist sectors gained strength at the beginning of the 
21st century. The main difference with the 1990s is the abandonment of a reactive and 
pragmatic position, with flexible tactics and avoiding seeking direct confrontation with 
other powers, for a more proactive and somewhat more demanding one12. Xi Jinping's 
thought (xijinping sixiang -习近平思想) includes objectives such as creating a powerful 
army, since China is on a "historical mission" for development13. 
 "The young generation is not happy, and the consequences are serious," says Song 
Xiaojun in his essay for the 2009 book Unhappy China (中国不高兴), which renews 
concepts that could be seen in the previous decade with China Can Say No. In this sense, 
2008 becomes a turning point, with the conflicts of the Olympics and increased 
international tension. Thus, in the last decade, one can appreciate a Chinese youth more 
involved in foreign policy issues. 
 On the other hand, in an authoritarian state, social networks, the media, and other 
Internet tools become a means for the population to express its opinion. Despite the 
extensive control, the Chinese government cannot ignore the wishes of the population, 
who also wants to reaffirm China's position as a world power. The government has 
accepted this popular nationalist sentiment to legitimize the actions of the state and has 
received the population’s support, who criticizes the West for demonizing China and 
imposing sanctions on human rights issues, the Taiwan problem, etc.14. For example, in 
April 2020, Chinese writer Fang Fang from Wuhan wrote a diary about her experience 
during the pandemic on her Weibo page. The Chinese public severely criticized her for 
allowing this diary to be published in the West and make China subject of criticism.  
 However, Chinese popular nationalism is a "double-edged sword". In the past 
there was an incipient pragmatic nationalism which connected the nation during hard 
times, but now, as China rises to become one of the most powerful countries in the world, 
there is a widening gap between their foreign image and confidence, and the social 
struggles of an increasingly complex society. There are internal complications and a 
national identity crisis rooted in the rapid growth of the past decades, which poses the 
question of how the future looks like for the Chinese system. After the decline of Marxism 
 
12 Zhao: 2013, pp. 5-6; Hughes: 2011 
13 Holbig: 2019, pp. 3-4 
14 Zhao: 2013, pp. 6-7 
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and Maoism, there was a need to have a legitimizing ideology for the CPC, and this need 
was filled by nationalism. However, due to its unpredictable nature, it can be potentially 
destabilizing and, although national planners do consider it a beneficial factor, it has not 
been let loose15. 
In this case, for example, certain sectors have sometimes shown their discontent 
with what has been considered a passive attitude in foreign policy. On the other hand, 
although anti-Japanese protests have been allowed on social networks to criticize Japan's 
historical revisionism, in some cases the government has had to ban anti-Japanese protests 
that could endanger social order. In other words, nationalism could become a 
destabilizing factor16. For this same reason, the Xi administration does not promote the 
protests as such, although it does allow some expressions of this popular nationalism as 
long as they do not involve a major confrontation17. 
 Hence, to what extent can nationalism affect foreign policy? In the case of China, 
state discourse and nationalist propaganda play a very important role in obtaining the 
legitimacy of the population. That is, the ideology of the population is clearly influenced 
by this discourse, but there are also bottom-up movements. Despite being a non-
democratic state, nationalist expressions can become destabilizing and critical factors. 
The Chinese population has increasingly higher expectations of what the government 
should do to reassert China's position as a world leader. There is no doubt that there are 
multiple opinions and branches of Chinese nationalism18, however, due to the censorship 
of certain topics it is difficult to make an in-depth study in this aspect. 
  
 JAPANESE NEO-NATIONALISM 
 The emergence of a national consciousness in Japan takes form in the Meiji 
Restoration, although it had already been developing since the Edo period19. The arrival 
of Commodore Perry in 1853 led to a series of crises and internal reforms that resulted in 
a modern national entity. It is when a nation acquires a certain level of development that 
 
15 Kim: 2018, p. 37. 
16 Zhao: 2013, p. 8 
17 Center for Strategic & International Studies: 2020 
18 Ibid 
19 Doak: 2006, p. 40. 
9 
 
the nationalist sentiment flourishes, with ideas like Nihonjinron (日本人論)20. During 
Japanese expansionism, propaganda increased with emphasis on the tenno ideology of 
emperor worship and Japanese ethnic purity (minzoku). The education system, along with 
economic development and foreign influence, fed the idea that Japan had to regain its 
position in the world as a leader21. This information suggests that this is a recurrent 
concept, similar in some aspects to Chinese nationalism22, with a strong sense of moralism 
and rectitude towards foreign policy as the nation has been "victimized" by imperialist 
forces. 
 After losing the war, Japan was in ruins. This does not mean that nationalism 
disappeared—on the contrary, the nation felt victimized by the imposition of foreign 
forces—but it changed its course23. During the early post-war period, there was a sense 
of cultural nihilism spread in the population, who connected the Japanese traditional 
values and the emperor to the downfall of the Japanese. In other words, nationalism was 
depoliticized. Later, there was a considerable economic improvement and the Japanese 
started to regain their national pride, that had been greatly damaged due to Japan’s role 
as a war perpetrator24. Education was used to revive the Japanese identity, promoting 
Shintoism, the Yasukuni Shrine, and control of public opinion on war crimes. In this sense, 
the Liberal Democratic Party, the current majority government party, played an important 
role in keeping Japanese nationalist sentiment alive during the post-war period. With 
economic development, Japan began to regain control and, despite wanting to maintain 
good relations with the West, they took up the idea that this did not mean giving up or 
losing their national identity25. The sociologist Ikutarou Shimizu stated in his book 日本
よ国家たれ (nippon yo kokka tare26): "On the one hand, Japan has to promote good 
relations with America, the Soviet Union and all other countries, but at the same time, we 
should not forget for a moment that Japan is alone. In the end, we can only count on Japan 
and the Japanese."  
 
20 Sugimoto: 2002, p. 33. 
21 Going: 1986, p. 24. 
22 Sutter: 2012. 
23 Doak: 2006. 
24 Kim: 2018, p. 39.  
25 Going, D., 1986, p. 54-55. 
26 1980, taken from Going. 
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 Since the 90s, this emerging neo-nationalism turned into a “revisionist trend”. 
With the Gulf War, the death of Hirohito and the fiftieth anniversary of defeat in 194527, 
the liberal elite tried to promote a positive view of the nation. This is coupled with the 
fact that they might be losing the economic hegemony in the East Asian region, creating 
a power parity that threatens Japan’s national identity28. 
 Japanese nationalism is often associated with the notion of the nation as one, 
homogeneous, especially during the 20th century, but these data suggest that Abe's current 
nationalist discourse does not focus on racial purity. Nationalism must be understood as 
a dynamic reality that erodes depending on its historical context. Other authors also agree 
with the idea that Japan has entered a new phase with post-war nationalism, characterized 
by a lack of harmony between the state and the population. In other words, there is a latent 
desire in modern Japan for national respect and autonomy, but the very concept of 
"nationalism" (with its different names in Japanese29) can cause discomfort. Doak30 states 
that the most important expressions of this neo-nationalism come from politicians and 
journalists, who advocate restoring a healthy nationalism. He suggests that the Japanese 
and the state are alienated, but that democratic practice should also be supported by civic 
bottom-up movements, and not only reflected in the discourse of the political elite.  This 
is what Kayama calls petit nationalism, with a youth unconcerned with the affairs of state 
and the history of the nation31. Therefore, the current Japanese political elite with Shinzo 
 
27 Kersten: 1999, p. 195. 
28 Kim: 2018, p. 40. 
29 When researching the Western concepts of “nationalism” and “nation” in Asian languages, there are 
great semantic differences and connotations that cannot be taken lightly.  
In the case of Japanese, the Western idea of “nationalism” can be best translated as ナショナリズム 
(nashyonarizumu), clearly a loanword from English. However, one can also find translations such as  民族
主義 (minzokushugi), which refers to the idea of ethnic superiority, or 国家主義 (kokkashugi), which is 
certainly closer to the idea of statism, or 国粋主義 (kokusuishugi), with a strong negative connotation 
that could be translated as “extreme nationalism” or “ultranationalism”, or even 愛国主義 (aikokushugi), 
which is closer to the idea of “patriotism”. The concept of “nation” can also be complicated to translate 
into Japanese, with terms such as words 民族 (minzoku) or 国民 (kokumin) that came into the Japanese 
conceptual map during the Meiji era. These are rough translations and perhaps don’t embody the idea 
precisely. The point is that the studies of nationalism in Japan don’t follow the same semantic patterns as 
in the West, so it is important to address nationalism in Asia as a multidimensional idea.  
Regarding its translations into Chinese, the situation is even more complicated. There is the word 国家主
义 (guojiazhuyi) that is, again, better translated as “statism”, or 爱国主义(aiguozhuyi) with the meaning 
of “patriotism”. One could also translate it as 民族主义 (minzuzhuyi) and it is the preferred term, yet I 
cannot help but feel that it carries an ethnic connotation that does not represent the full idea, especially 
since the rising Chinese nationalist sentiment is not “ethnic”.  
30 Doak: 2006, pp. 278-286 
31 Penney and Wakefield: 2008, p. 2 
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Abe, from its multiple positions regarding nationalism and the success of the nation, seeks 
to awaken a civic nationalism in this "carefree" population and to leave behind the ethnic 
nationalism of certain intellectual sectors32. 
 To quote the words of Doak, “How will the pieces of Japanese nationalism be 
reassembled?”33 The information suggests that the LDP will continue with its nationalist 
discourse and policy, as seen with the visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, or the proposals to 
modify the constitution, but it still does not seem to have been conclusive. On the other 
hand, the nuances and true form of this "healthy nationalism" that Abe advocates remain 
to be seen, especially on issues like historical revisionism. It can also be argued that anti-
militarism or "pacific nationalism" is no less nationalist than the liberal discourse of the 
LDP. In fact, according to a survey in Yomiuri, the young population is more opposed to 
the revision of Article 9 of the constitution than the older population34. In other words, it 
could be said that there is a liberal-nationalist political sector, associated with what we 
see in the newspapers as Japanese neo-nationalism, but perhaps it does not represent the 
reality of the heterogeneous population. Nationalism is not usually presented in a single 
form, but is complex and associated with multiple factors, and Japan is no exception in 
this regard. Of course, as far as foreign policy is concerned, the ideology of the party in 
power is very relevant in practice. 
 As the historian Masayasu Hosaka said35: "We have been fleeing from nationalism 
since the war until now. We hate the word 'nationalism' [ナショナリズム]. However, 
we should not run away. We should think about what our nationalism is." 
  
 INFLUENCE OF NATIONALISM IN SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS 
 According to a study of nationalism in 201236, which included responses from 
participants from multiple countries, China was reported as the country with the strongest 
nationalist sentiment, ahead of countries such as the U.S., Taiwan and Canada. Japan was 
eighth on the list, and Spain was number 25. These data suggest that the countries studied 
 
32 Doak: 2006, pp. 278-286 
33 Ibid, p. 286 
34 Penney and Wakefield: 2008, p. 4-5 
35 Eisuke: 2019 
36 Tang and Darr: 2012. 
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in this paper have high levels of nationalism, each with their own characteristics, but how 
has this been reflected in the practice of international politics? 
 It is argued that China and Japan have kept a “negative peace”, created due to a 
lack of mutual understanding in overcoming the sense of past injustices through open and 
comprehensive communication. This tense international context could seem concerning 
as power dynamics change in East Asia with China’s rise, also threatening the United 
States’ hegemony, its close ally, Japan, and other leading countries in Asia. A very current 
example of China’s proactive position in foreign policy would be the recent conflict with 
India. An opinion article on The Japan Times’ website claimed on June 2020 that “India’s 
appeasement of China has indeed failed and so will the West’s and Japan’s” since 
“appeasements always embolden the adversary”.  The article urges the liberal and 
democratic countries to act upon this and counter Chinese aggression37. According to 
some theoretical assumptions, an armed conflict is more likely to occur when a rising 
country poses a threat to the status quo, especially those in which there are deep-seated 
grievances. This is to say that due to the deeply rooted hostilities and collective historical 
memory of mutual antagonism, connected to their nationalist sentiment, if the existing 
order is to change, the odds of an explosive conflict are higher38.  
 During the Cold War, Japan and China shared the common interest in keeping 
regional stability, as neither was fit to assume a leadership role in East Asia. However, 
the 21st century hostilities and power shifts brought to light the lingering nationalism of 
both countries, further complicating Sino-Japanese relations. Nationalism has been 
identified as one of the most potent forces that could deteriorate their relations. However, 
it is hard to pinpoint to what extent and how due to its vulnerability to being controlled 
by the government, political forces, or even the public39. 
 In the case of Sino-Japanese relations, the nationalist sentiment is especially 
relevant. There has been an effort in China to keep collective memory alive regarding 
Japan’s war crimes and other unsolved issues, such as the Nanjing Massacre, or territorial 
disputes, which ends up triggering an anti-Japanese sentiment. This sentiment, as seen in 
the previous section, has developed from “an essentially state-led ideology to an 
 
37 The Japan Times: 2020.  
38 Kim: 2018, p. 33. 
39 Ibid, p. 34. 
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increasingly society-driven phenomenon”40. However, this is not to say that popular 
Chinese nationalism is the only factor, but rather an increasing point of influence, in its 
relations with Japan. For example, when it comes to dealing with sensitive Japan-related 
issues like those mentioned above, the Chinese government has less flexibility since a 
lack of action could be perceived as weak, and it could cause a turn against the 
government and political instability. In addition, the Chinese government’s efforts to keep 
a harmonious relationship with Japan are constrained by that same idea of becoming the 
regional political architect, which has some contradictions. Nonetheless, Beijing wishes 
to maintain peace, but to achieve this, it will have to deal with unresolved historical issues, 
territorial disputes and national pride41. 
 Regarding the Japanese side, the rise of China poses a threat in terms of security 
and hegemony in Asia, so through the promotion of a “healthy nationalism” discourse, 
the government wishes to defend itself against external forces and boost its military 
strength. When there was the normalization of Chinese-Japanese relations in 1972, Japan 
had the upper hand both economically and militarily, partially thanks to its security 
agreement with the United States. Since the regional order favored Japan, most of the 
anti-Chinese discourse revolved around these same sensitive issues and disputes, such as 
the Senkaku Islands, but the focus of nationalist discourse was rather domestic and not 
reflected in Japan’s cordial foreign policy approach. However, this changed in the late 
20th century, with the rise of China’s economy and power. The Tiananmen Square protests 
in 1989 raised alerts among the Japanese elites, who saw the events as an act of brutality 
and felt less comfortable engaging with China. Other issues that deteriorated the public 
opinion of China were its claim over the Diaoyu Islands, the Taiwan Strait Crisis (1995-
1996), or the nuclear testing it undertook in 1995. As China’s military power grew, so did 
the Japanese concern to strengthen its military strength and defend itself, which paved the 
way for a nationalist discourse that would have been unthinkable decades ago: supporting 
the amendment of the Constitution. Since China is perceived as a threat in the last decades, 
politicians who have presented a “tough” stand against China were praised by the public, 
and those who didn’t were seen as diplomatically weak. This means that Japanese foreign 
 
40 Kim: 2018, p. 37. 
41 Ibid, pp. 38-39. 
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policy planners also have to adopt a strict posture with China to obtain a favorable public 
opinion42. 
 Nationalism plays an important role in territorial disputes for both countries, 
especially due to their complicated history with their neighboring countries. The 
Japanese-Korean dispute over the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands is an example of a similar 
volatile situation, but there are plenty of unsolved territorial controversies in the East 
China Sea. The main reason why the Senkaku Island dispute is so relevant is because 
firstly, it involves the strongest military and economic powers in East Asia. Secondly, the 
Chinese nationalist discourse is based on the assertation that China was subject to 
imperialist attacks from Japan and Western powers and China will regain what they took 
from them, which means that their foreign policy decisions should be congruent. Lastly, 
China’s military and economic strength poses a threat to Japan (and by extension, the 
United States), who has acted accordingly reinforcing its military power. One could argue 
that the Senkaku dispute is seemingly calmer than other territorial disputes, but a 
confrontation could be more damaging in the long term43. 
 There was an interesting survey done in 2016 by the Pew Research Center44 that 
analyzed in depth the mutual negative feelings between the two countries. The study 
showed that only 11 % of the Japanese viewed China favorably, and only 14 % of the 
Chinese had a good opinion of the Japanese, which are the lowest levels they respectively 
have when compared with other neighboring countries. The study goes further and 
investigates what causes this distrust, which is seemingly rooted in negative stereotypes. 
81 % of the Japanese see the Chinese as arrogant, and 70 % of the Chinese share this 
opinion about Japan. Almost three out of four Japanese consider the Chinese nationalistic, 
but only 41 % of Chinese view them in the same light.  Roughly seven out of ten in each 
country consider the other country’s citizens violent. Neither of the countries see the other 
as honest. The study shows that the older generations are more likely to share these 
stereotypes.  
 When approaching on the main triggers of nationalism, Japan’s war crimes during 
World War II, in 2016 53 % of the Japanese “believed they had apologized enough for 
it”—and the figure is on the rise—but only 10 % of the Chinese agree with this statement. 
 
42 Kim: 2018, p. 41. 
43 Ibid, p. 45. 
44 Stokes: 2016. 
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In addition, 80 % of the Japanese and nearly 60 % of the Chinese think that “territorial 
disputes between China and its neighbors could lead to a military conflict”. This 
extremely negative mutual perception of these two powerful countries is the reason why, 
even though other territorial disputes seem less under-control in the South China Sea, the 
Senkaku Island dispute could be a more volatile issue. Perhaps, a similar issue would be 
the Takeshima/Dokdo dispute, as only 27 % of the Japanese expressed in 2016 a favorable 
opinion of Koreans, showing a decrease in the last decade45. Considering the Korean-
Japanese political tensions in 2019, it is likely public opinion has dropped even more and 
thus poses a problem when dealing with territorial disputes.   
It goes without saying that in China there is still some hostility against the 
Japanese, a feeling that has come to light in the last 20 years with demonstrations over 
the Senkaku Islands dispute, the visits of Prime Ministers Shinzo Abe and Junichiro 
Koizumi to the Yasukuni Shrine, or the Japanese history textbook that almost ignored the 
war crimes committed by Japan during World War II. Similarly, many Japanese are 
concerned about China’s growth as a world leader and its increasingly assertive East 
China Sea policy, coupled with Japan’s economic decline. According to a 2005 survey46, 
more than 70% of Japanese people claimed to have negative feelings about China or not 
to trust it. In conclusion, it could be said that the past hinders a good relationship between 
Japan and some Asian countries, but this same past and the discourse of historical 
legitimacy of China in terms of sovereignty are today a reason for complications in 
foreign policy47. 
In both countries, the correlation of nationalism and foreign policy is seen with 
issues such as the Comfort Women, the Nanjing massacre, or the disputed territories in 
the South China Sea such as the Spradley Islands or the Paracel Islands. In line with this 
idea, the case study for this paper, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute, is a matter that 
greatly concerns both countries and remains unsolved, acting as a frequent trigger of 
political tension in recent years as mentioned. Thus, for a dual application, this section 
aims to analyze more in depth the anti-Japanese sentiment in China and the anti-Chinese 
sentiment in Japan, both of which are interconnected with nationalism, and the 
consequences on territorial disputes in the East China Sea. The goal is to reflect their 
 
45 Strokes: 2016. 
46 Reuters: 2005, taken from Metraux. 
47 Metraux: 2013, p. 9. 
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shifting power relations and the politics of nationalism, bottom-up and top-down, 
intertwined with collective memory of history through the analysis of the Senkaku48 
Island dispute. 
  
 CASE STUDY: THE SENKAKU/DIAOYU ISLAND DISPUTE 
 Brief Introduction to Sino-Japanese Relations 
 The shared and contested region of the East China Sea shapes the interactions of 
China and Japan with their other Asian neighbors. Because of this, this paper presents 
Sino-Japanese Relations in a three-dimensional context: from the perspective of security 
(or military) policies, economic connections, and cultural ties49. These three elements are 
interconnected, shaping the diplomatic practice of these countries.  
 In the first place, as mentioned in terms of security, after tensions during the Cold 
War, through the U.S.-Chinese rapprochement, Japan incorporated China in the 
“developing conception of national security”, a move which China reciprocated. This was 
the steppingstone to building a region where neither could seek hegemony in what is now 
considered the Asia Pacific region. Until today, the region’s security and balance are 
dependent on the People’s Republic of China, Japan and the United States, who is also 
closely involved due to the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the 
United States and Japan signed in 195150. Currently, China has expanded its naval fleet 
and its defense perimeter farther from the coast51 , which means it is on its way to 
becoming a major maritime power in the contested region of East Asia. Hence the great 
interest in gaining the sovereignty of key locations in the East and South China Sea. As 
for Japan, it views these advances with alarm and reemphasized the protection of its 
territory52. It is also a key element in Abe’s campaign to amend Article 9 of the Japanese 
Constitution, and a record defense budget of 5.31 trillion yen (€43.3 billion) was approved 
for the year 202053.  
 
48 The use of “Senkaku” or “Diaoyu” in this text to refer to the islands is arbitrary, and it not connected 
to a political standpoint. 
49 This is inspired in Iriye’s paper Chinese-Japanese Relations, 1945-90. 
50 Iriye: 1990, pp. 1-6. 
51 Metraux: 2013, pp. 5-6. 
52 Smith: 2013, p. 13. 
53 Yamaguchi: 2019.  
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 Secondly, regarding their economic ties, China and Japan have moved in a 
consistent direction, with growing ties and interdependence. Since they began trading 
after 1949, China and Japan have grown to become large trade partners54. These “two 
countries [have enjoyed] a parallel economic relationship that features extensive and 
growing interdependence and cross-investment.” In 2009, China was the largest 
destination for Japanese exports. At the moment, the trend seems to favor China and in 
2011, they surpassed Japan’s earnings and became the world’s second largest economy55. 
China is among Japan’s main trading partners and sources of inbound tourism, and Japan 
has been vital to China in the transfer of technology. Regardless of political tensions, their 
economic ties are strong, a situation to which some refer as “hot economics, cold 
politics”56. 
 Thirdly, it is important to highlight the strong cultural bonds between the 
neighboring countries. By “cultural”, this work refers to the areas that go beyond 
economic or security affairs 57 . China was a reference of cultural, religious and 
technological development for the Japanese for centuries, which deeply impacted 
Japanese thinking and the Japanese perception of the world until today. On the other side, 
however, the brutal wars of the 20th century have scarred their international relations and 
are a key factor as to the cultural ties between China and Japan. The emotional and 
psychological consequences remain relevant to foreign policy decisions—closely 
connected to the growing nationalist sentiment in both countries—even if they do well 
diplomatically and economically.  
Thus, conflicts between these two countries can be approached through the three-
dimensional framework of security, economy and culture. In addition, although clearly 
not solely dependent on it, nationalism is a part of the multilayered international relations 
between China and Japan and needs to be understood in such context. 
 
 
The Senkaku Island Dispute 
 
54 Iriye: 1990, pp. 7-8. 
55 Smith: 2013, p. 11. 
56 West: 2020. 
57 Iriye: 1990, p. 12. 
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To analyze and explain the territorial Senkaku Island dispute, this paper uses the 
three-dimensional framework mentioned above. But in the first place, what are the 
Senkaku Islands58? They are “a small group of islands59 at the southwestern edge of the 
East China Sea. [...] They are located 120 nautical miles (nm) northeast of Taiwan, 200 
nm east of China, and 200 nm southwest of the Japanese island of Okinawa”.  The 
Senkaku Islands are probably inhabitable, as they are presently inhabited and 
administered by Japan, but both China and Japan have expressed their territorial claims 
over the islands since the 70s. But what is it that makes them so special? It is not the 
islands’ economic value per se, but rather their strategic location near offshore areas that 
are said to be rich in oil and gas, as well as rich fishing grounds. Furthermore, owning 
these islands “could potentially generate extensive areas of maritime jurisdiction” 60. 
In terms of security, the Senkaku islands are very interesting due to their strategic 
location. As stated, both China and Japan have significantly strengthened their navies and 
maritime defenses, so having the islands, in the middle of the East China Sea, connecting 
Japan, Taiwan and the PRC, would allow to strengthen control of the area and ensure sea 
routes. The Japanese government is concerned because China has allocated more 
resources to its defenses and has expressed its wishes to build a submarine military base 
in the Senkaku Islands’ region, which could endanger Japanese national security. 
However, Japan is not the only one concerned about the Senkaku becoming a Chinese 
sovereign territory. China’s assertion of its sovereignty over the islands affects the 
security pact Japan has with the United States, so it’s not merely a bilateral affair. 
Especially due to the proximity of the Senkaku Islands to Okinawa, where U.S. military 
forces are located61.  
Concerning the economic benefits, the islands are near offshore areas that are said 
to be rich in oil and gas, as well as rich fishing grounds62. After World War II, Japan was 
forced to return all territories seized from China, but the fate of the Senkaku remained 
unclear, probably because it was empty. This issue would have remained on standby if it 
hadn’t been for the UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East’s survey in 1968 
 
58 尖閣諸島 senkaku hotō, or in Chinese 钓鱼台 diaoyutai 
59 Due to size and characteristics of the islands, some scholars have even doubted whether they can be 
considered islands at all. The area is 6.3 km2 in total. 
60 Yiallourides: 2017, pp. 1-2. 
61 Metraux: 2013, pp. 5-6. 
62 Yiallourides: 2017, pp. 2. 
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that revealed that there was probably a large deposit of hydrocarbon resources “on or near 
the continental shelf that stretches off the China coast”63. Some efforts of joint exploration 
for hydrocarbon resources were made in 2008, but the 2010 boat collision scuttled this64.  
Lastly, there is the “cultural” dimension to the dispute. Security and economic 
reasons are a part of it, indeed, but Japan and China have a complicated past. The Chinese 
still harbor grievance about the Japanese invasion in the 20th century and accuse them of 
denying war crimes. The Chinese have a sense of entitlement of regional hegemony, 
which is fueled by the state, and inevitably puts these two countries at odds. In fact, the 
Chinese claim that the United States is helping Japan in depriving China from what they 
consider their rightful ownership of these islands. On the other hand, Japan claims that 
the islands had always been terra nullius.  In a way, the Senkaku Island dispute65 could 
be perceived as a way for both countries to “vent their nationalist frustrations”66.  
 
 Recent Development of the Dispute  
 In 2010, the Chinese fishing boat Minjinyu 5179 collided67 with two Japan coast 
guard vessels, which led to Japan’s decision to arrest the Chinese fishing boat’s captain. 
After this, China demanded compensation and an apology from Japan, but Prime Minister 
Naoto Kan defended Japan’s sovereignty over the islands and rejected this. In the months 
that followed, plenty of cultural and political exchanges were canceled. In the end, Japan 
released the captain and took a step back, but both nations reinforced their surveillance 
of the area68. 
On September 2012, the international tension concerning the Diaoyu Islands 
peaked. This was caused by the signing of a contract by the Japanese government that 
 
63 Metrauz: 2013, p. 5. 
64 Smith: 2013, pp. 12-13. 
65  It is worth mentioning that Taiwan’s role in this dispute is unique too and a further study of the 
nationalism in Taiwan would be relevant in this dispute. After all, the Taiwanese have shown their 
discomfort regarding Japanese patrol vessels and consider the island theirs. In fact, Beijing claims that the 
Diaoyu Island is Taiwan’s and, following the One China Policy, this would mean that they are part of the 
PRC too. Although Taiwan plays a minor role in the dispute due to a lack of international recognition, they 
were the first representatives of the Chinese part of the dispute in the 70s and still lay their claim over 
the island. In 2015, President Tsai Ing Wen reconfirmed Taiwan’s claim over the islands.  
66 Metraux: 2013, p. 9. 
67 In 1978 China and Japan were in another diplomatic issue when an Armada of Chinese ships and smaller 
vessels entered the Senkaku’s territorial waters. The Chinese authorities explained this as an “accident.” 
68 Valencia: 2011, pp. 79-80; Smith: 2013, p. 2.  
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purchased for 2.05 billion yen (€23.2 million) three of the five main islands that constitute 
the Senkaku Island group in order to nationalize them. Since Japan was already 
administrating them, this was largely symbolic but, naturally, the Chinese perceived this 
as a provocation. In the months that followed, Japanese citizens and businesses were 
subject to violence and boycotted in sectors such as airlines or automobile 
manufacturers69. The impact of these protests was so large that IMF Chief Christine 
Lagarde expressed her concerns and stated that they should not be “distracted by 
territorial division”. Since “the global economy needs both Japan and China fully 
engaged”, the international market felt the consequences of political tension in East Asia.  
As for the United States, Washington’s stance on this dispute is officially neutral, 
but their security agreement with Japan, their close relations and the political tension with 
China suggest that it is in the United States’ best interest that Japan maintains the 
administration of the islands. The United States encouraged both parties to stay cool-
headed concerning the diplomatic issue70, but the United States’ position on the matter 
has increasingly become one of more involvement. In the 1970s, the United States kept a 
neutral discourse, and it wasn’t clear whether the Security Treaty would also cover the 
Senkaku Islands71. However, because of China’s bid for regaining regional hegemony, 
the U.S. Government has stated more clearly the scope of their military agreement with 
Japan. For example, in 2014 at a joint press conference in Tokyo with Prime Minister 
Abe, former President Obama stated that “Article 5 covers all territories under Japan’s 
administration, including the Senkaku Islands”, but he emphasized cooperation rather 
than the situation escalating72. In 2017 at the first meeting of the U.S.-Japan Security 
Consultative Committee under the Trump Administration, the authorities involved 
reconfirmed that “the United States and Japan oppose any unilateral action that seeks to 
undermine Japan’s administration of [The Senkaku] islands”73.  
Diplomatic tensions were somewhat relieved with the signing of an agreement in 
2014. As stated on this four-point agreement, both parties would follow “the spirit of 
squarely facing history and advancing toward the future”. They did recognize for the first 
time ever that they “had different views” concerning the Senkaku Island dispute and that 
 
69 Smith: 2013, p. 2. 
70 Chan: 2012. 
71 Kim: 2018, p. 48. 
72 The White House: 2014. 
73 U.S. Department of Defense: 2017.  
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they “would prevent the deterioration of the situation, establish a crisis management 
mechanism and avert the rise of unforeseen circumstances”74. This provided a breath of 
fresh air after the conflict in 2012, but no further comments on the sovereignty were made, 
maintaining the same status quo as before75.  
This was clearly a vague proposal, and it did not offer an actual solution to the 
dispute. Recently, the media were announcing that they had sighted Chinese Coast Guards’ 
boats very often since mid-April 202076—they stayed in territorial waters of the Senkaku 
Islands at least three days and different media outlets reported that Chinese boats had 
entered, some said even every day, beating a record, but the official figure doesn’t seem 
clear. This is nothing out of the ordinary since Chinese Coast Guards have been 
surveilling the area and entering it since 2008. However, the frequency does seem to be 
rising and Chinese authorities are getting bolder77. Meanwhile in June 2020, Chinese 
media expressed their anger about the decision of the city government of Ishigaki 
(Okinawa Prefecture) to change the administrative designation of the Senkaku Islands’ 
area78. Minister of Foreign Affairs Zhao Lijian claimed that these actions are “a serious 
provocation of China’s territorial sovereignty, it is illegal and invalid” and that they 
“resolutely oppose” 79. Maintaining the status quo seems to be the preferred option by 
both countries, and by the United States. Even though things are seemingly back to 
normal, the above information suggests that as long as a definite solution isn’t found, 
problems will keep arising.  
 
 Nationalism in the Dispute 
 As early as 1972, Henry Kissinger’s State Department warned him to avoid the 
“volatile and nationalistic Senkaku Islands issue”80. And this was precisely what both 
involved parties chose to do. China and Japan had several unresolved issues but during 
the post-war era, they chose to put them aside for the sake of their economic ties and 
cordial diplomatic relations. Nationalism had a domestic outlet, China held a pragmatic 
 
74 [Japanese] Ministry of Foreign Affairs: 2014. 
75 Perlez: 2014. 
76 Lendon: 2020.  
77 Kotani: 2020.  
78 SINA News: 2020.  
79 [Chinese] Ministry of Foreign Affairs: 2020. 
80 Smith: 2013, p. 10. 
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stance, and both accepted the status quo. However nowadays, the shift in power dynamics 
have made the East China Sea (and South China Sea) points of diplomatic tension due to 
territorial disputes81.  
 The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute, recent and still complicating Sino-Japanese 
relations, serves as an example of the importance of nationalism both in top-down and 
bottom-up movements in international politics. China is involved in several territorial 
disputes in the surrounding seas, but the dispute over these islands touches on a nationalist 
vein because of the resentment that the history of Japanese imperialism arouses, which 
was already very much present in the famous protest of the May 4th Movement in 1919. 
Despite the strategic and economic advantages that the sovereignty of these islands could 
bring, the conflicts over their sovereignty date back to the First Sino-Japanese War and 
trigger a sense of injustice among the Chinese people. The goal to restore China’s pride 
is closely connected to the humiliation they felt after their defeat against Japan, which 
also explains why the Chinese government seems to have a stronger nationalist discourse 
about this dispute, compared to other disputes it has with Vietnam or the Philippines82.  
Therefore, Japan’s claim to the islands and especially the nationalization of three 
of them in 2012 was a turning point in the dispute83. This was not the first time there was 
diplomatic tension over the islands, as was the case in 2010, but it was possibly the most 
important one so far. In China, there was a boycott of Japanese companies and businesses 
on a large scale, looting, violent attacks, mass protests on social networks and in public, 
extensive media coverage of the conflict, etc. 84 . Despite the Chinese government’s 
favorable view of expressions of popular nationalism and the fact that these protests 
supported its position, it is not clear to what extent the government allowed them85. 
Ambassador Li Baodong, during the General Debate of the 67th Session of the UN 
General Assembly in 2012, made the following statement: 
Japan’s so-called “nationalization” of the Diaoyu Dao is based purely on the logic of robbers. At 
the end of the 19th century, Japan stole from China large chunks of territory, including the Diaoyu 
 
81 Kim: 2018, p. 44.  
82 Ibid. 
83 Greenfeld: 2012. 
84 Zhao: 2013, p. 19. 
85 Chen Weiss: 2013, p. 6 
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Dao, through a colonial war of aggression. Now we are in the 21st century. Japan still adopts the 
obsolete colonial mentality [..] 86. 
For Beijing, the fact that Japan, the United States and other countries in the region 
have strengthened their military power seems to be because they feel China is challenging 
their hegemony. Hence, China will not stand still either.  
 On the other hand, it is worth mentioning that this feeling is not exclusive to China. 
The Japanese government nationalized the islands because the governor of Tokyo and 
nationalist Shintaro Ishihara intended to buy the islands himself to add them to the 
metropolitan region through a fundraising campaign. His intention was “to do whatever 
was necessary to protect [their] own territory”87. Indeed, Beijing saw this as a conspiracy 
between the governor Shintaro Ishihara and the Japanese government to make their move 
and assert their sovereignty over the islands88. From Japan’s perspective, the islands are 
terra nullius and China is trying to take over a territory it never had.  In Tokyo, a few 
thousand people participated in anti-Chinese protests and criticized the ruling Democratic 
Party of Japan (DPJ) for a weak attitude towards China, which benefited the Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP) in the following elections89. Although anti-Japanese protests in 
China were stronger, the information suggests that large-scale anti-Chinese sentiment in 
Japan is an important issue, as was also seen with the hashtag that trended on Twitter 
recently due to COVID-19: #ChineseDon’tComeToJapan90.  
 According to the same study by the Pew Research Center91, LDP voters are more 
critical of China, more likely to say China is nationalistic and less likely to think Japan 
hasn’t apologized enough about war crimes than those of the DPJ. Similarly, LDP voters 
are more critical of South Korea. Hence, the Senkaku Islands’ controversy in 2012 
benefited the nationalist and ultra-conservative Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s victory in 
the 2012 general elections with the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), along with “the 
emergence in the political scene of a populist and nationalist party (the Japan Restoration 
Party)”. Both groups have been vocal about their nationalism and historical revisionist 
standpoint, which has been associated with a growing neo-nationalism in Japan92. When 
 
86 The World and Japan Database: 2012. 
87 Smith: 2013, p. 1. 
88 Kim: 2018, p. 47.  
89 Chen Weiss: 2013, p. 5-6 
90 Rich: 2020. 
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they first arrested the Chinese boat’s captain, former Prime Minister Naoto Kan from the 
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) reacted defiantly. "Senkaku is an integral part of 
Japanese territory. […] I have no intention of accepting [the demand] at all,” he told the 
reporters93. However, China’s coercive tactics did succeed and, as mentioned, eventually 
the captain was released. The DPJ paid a costly price for this in terms of public opinion, 
especially due to Chinese captain signing “V” for victory on television. Their 
administration was heavily criticized by the LPD and it was perceived as a failure94. The 
influential Nippon Kaigi conservative organization, in which Shinzo Abe serves as a 
special advisor, stated in its website that, “The Senkaku Islands are an inherent part of 
our country's territory, both historically and according to international law. We 
categorically protest to the Chinese side's unlawful and repeated actions on our territory. 
We can’t help but feel outrage at the weak response our government has given to defend 
out territorial waters”95.  
 This nationalism is reflected on the media and, at the same time, it is the media 
that can also shape the nationalist sentiment. For a recent example, the renaming of the 
administrative Senkaku area was reported in June 2020 in the Japanese news outlet Asahi 
Shinbun with the following statement: “Ishigaki City to change the name of the Senkaku 
Islands to ‘Senkaku’ for efficiency purposes”96. The Chinese SINA News’ headline said 
that “The day Japan ‘renamed’ the Diaoyu Islands; China responded directly with 
action”97. Another recent example would be the Chinese Coast Guards’ surveilling the 
islands’ territorial waters, since each country has had a different take on it. The Okinawa 
Times, a local Japanese newspaper, headline on May 27 for this issue was “Chinese 
Government Ship ignores protests and threatens Okinawa fishing boat. The following day, 
they invaded territorial waters again”98. On May 17, Chinese newspaper Global Times 
released an article with the headline “Japanese politician brags about going to Diaoyu 
Island to scare off Chinese coastguard ship, ends up being chased by Chinese coastguard 
ship for an hour”. They also claim that China has been entering Senkaku territorial waters 
since April99  and, up until the 29th of June 2020, Chinese media have reported that 
 
93 As quoted in Smith: 2013, p. 2.  
94 Chen Weiss: 2013, p. 6. 
95 Nippon Kaigi: 2012. 
96 Okada: 2020.  
97 SINA News: 2020. 
98 Okinawa Times: 2020. 
99 Global Times: 2020. 
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Chinese coastguards have done so for 77 consecutive days. This is interesting to keep in 
mind, as top-down driven nationalism is greatly influenced by what the media announce. 
In addition, the media also want to write things that will sell and match public opinion, 
confirming the anti-Japanese or anti-Chinese mindset deeply rooted in the East Asian 
landscape.  
 On October 1978, Deng Xiaoping reportedly said that “it would be wise for our 
two governments to avoid talking about this issue [the Diaoyu Islands]. Our generation is 
not wise enough to find a common ground, but our next generation will be wiser”100. 
Almost half a century later, it seems like this generation might not have changed as much 
as he thought.  
 
 CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this dissertation was to determine a connection between 
nationalism and foreign policy in China and Japan by analyzing the Senkaku/Diaoyu 
Island dispute. Since there is a growing nationalistic trend in these countries, it is relevant 
to study how this can affect their international relations and territorial disputes—
especially since their nationalism is rooted in the historical collective memory that 
triggers anti-Japanese/anti-Chinese sentiments.  
In the case of China, the growing popular nationalist sector advocates for 
regaining China’s hegemony and position as a world leader. After the painful 20th century, 
there is a seeping resentment towards imperialism, the West and Japan. Since China has 
managed to rise economically and militarily in the past decade, the government has 
adopted a more proactive attitude with foreign policy planning, which satisfied the 
demands of the nationalist sector. Still, the expectations for Chinese leaders are high and, 
with China being a very nationalist country, they must be handled carefully.  
As for Japan, their post-war relationship with nationalism might have even seemed 
antagonistic for a period. However, the current ruling elite and other influential groups in 
Japan represent a liberal neonationalism. Their interest is to move past the historic issues 
of the 20th century, establish a strong army as there is a concern about China’s growing 
power, and awaken a strong sentiment of “healthy” national pride. In the 21st century, 
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these two countries, who both suffered poverty and humiliation in the last century, have 
moved away from post-war nationalism.  
This suggests that nationalism is a dynamic political principal heavily influenced 
by its historical context. The nationalist state discourse in both countries does not depict 
the same ideas that it had 100 years ago, or even 50 years ago. National interests can 
change, and so can the nationalist sentiment. Determining the roots of nationalism, 
however, whether it is a bottom-up or top-down movement, is not an easy task.  
The information found also suggests that the ability of domestic politics and 
nationalist sentiment to restrict a government's scope of action should not be 
underestimated101. In terms of Sino-Japanese relations, hostilities born from unsolved 
issues and the collective memory of the 20th century’s wars are a heavy weight. There is 
a clear anti-Chinese and anti-Japanese sentiment respectively, mutual distrust, and a 
nationalist discourse. The two countries perceive the other as deceitful, biased and 
arrogant. These aspects are reflected in the portrayal of the information on the media, 
public opinion, and state discourse. Not to say that this dislike is unfounded, but rather 
that it is often fed unnecessarily. This means that these same tools can be used to create a 
favorable mutual opinion, at least to a certain degree.  
The Senkaku Islands case study in this paper serves to put this animosity into 
context. It is a dispute that concerns the First Sino-Japanese War, a matter of national 
pride, which places the two countries at odds. It is an issue that has triggered very large 
protest in China against Japan, and the Japanese have also been vocal about their dislike 
of this issue. National planners are put on the spot when making decisions, since the 
population demands a tough stance that might not be the most adequate for peaceful 
cooperation. This mutually hostile sentiment, which is not unique to the Senkaku Islands 
dispute, can even mean a risk for the economic partnership between China and Japan. 
Good economic relations don’t necessarily signify stable relations102.  
The governments in Beijing and Tokyo seem to accept expressions of nationalism, 
but these have not always turned out well for them, as was the case for the DPJ in the 
2012 elections or the protests in China that became too violent. In order to avoid large 
discrepancies, all parties involved have accepted to maintain the status quo, but this is not 
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really a solution for the Senkaku dispute. In fact, the key to the solution could be to first 
address the nationalist issues in the background. The perspectives aren’t really promising 
in this sense, as the situation has stagnated. Economic cooperation will follow, cordial 
but lukewarm political relations, and a complicated past. However, it is true that China 
has become bolder with time as it gained power, and this could be the case in the future.  
With the geopoliticization of nationalism, research on the political influence of 
nationalist sentiment could be very useful in East Asian international relations and 
territorial disputes. In Sino-Japanese bilateral relations, this is clearly not the only factor 
in the economic, security-related and cultural framework. The question then would be: is 
nationalism in China and Japan alarming? It would certainly be best if they worked as 
partners, and not as threats to each other. Of course, this is easier said than done. Still, the 
hindering of their bilateral relations would have to be motivated by forces beyond 
nationalism and the “cultural” dimension. 
Regarding the prospects of nationalism, there is a growing nationalist trend in both 
countries, but this might no longer be the case in the long term. A study in 2012 reported 
that as literacy levels in China rise, nationalism will decrease103. This could be true and, 
perhaps, other factors such as globalization and multicultural exchanges can serve as a 
pivot for less intense nationalism. China’s lightning growth into a developed nation is 
still in process, so it can be hard to estimate the sociological impact. In addition, there is 
also a lack of information about public opinion in China due to censorship. As for Japan, 
the most anti-Chinese population groups seem to be older than 30, perhaps this sentiment 
could also decrease in the long-term. On the other side, it could also be argued that the 
public can get more conservative with age but, again, the number of Chinese students in 
Japan and vice versa has greatly increased in the past 50 years. If only slightly, the 
interconnected world we live in can serve as a bridge to connect these nations. Unless 
there is an event that might hinder their relations even more, these hostilities could loosen 
up with time. It would be interesting to study the development of a “healthy nationalism” 
in Japan beyond the political elite. Further research is also encouraged including 
Taiwanese nationalism in the Senkaku dispute, or broadening the study to the Japanese-
Korean hostilities in territorial disputes to provide comparison.  
 
103 Wenfang and Darr: 2012, p. 823. 
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At an interview in 2015, former head of United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees and former President of the Japan International Cooperation Agency Sadako 
Ogata explained that “Japan cannot do without coexistence with Asian countries”. She 
said that the Japanese “thought we could survive if we just protected ourselves,” but this 
is not really the case. She explained that Japan has developed through international 
exchange, as it has with China in recent years104. East Asia still carries a heavy burden 
from the past, but rather than animosity, cooperation and dialogue could strengthen the 
region and become a first step towards mutual understanding, beyond nationalism. 
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